Cette dissertation de niveau 3eme année de licence vise à montrer que la mémoire dont Staline fait l'objet en Union Soviétique puis en Russie s'articule autour de deux éléments contradictoires : il est évidemment considéré comme un tyran sanguinaire, responsable de famines et d'épurations politiques, cependant est également célébré comme le héros de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, et vu comme un grand dirigeant de la Russie et de son peuple.
Sommaire de la fiche
I) The 'cult of personality'.
II) The ambiguous porcess of de-Stalinization
III) The Stalin's revival
Extraits de la fiche
[...] The first announcements of Stalin's death were written on newspapers. The official notice said immortal name of STALIN will always live in the hearts of the Soviet people? (Quoted in 1/7 Merridale, 2000: 329). Thus, Soviet élites officially celebrate Stalin's memory and still support the 'cult of personality' whose Stalin is the object. It should be emphasized that immediately after his death Stalin was not seen as a tyrant or a criminal within the Soviet people. Conversely, they got involved in the whole country to pay tribute to him. [...]
[...] Indeed, the discourse of de-Stalinisation was more often resisted than accepted. It chiefly seemed illogical in so far as it exclusively focused on Stalin rather than criticize the Stalinist system as a whole or even the Soviet framework itself. Jones underlines that some listeners, especially those in higher education establishments, the speech was disingenuously personalised account of Stalinism which, in demonising Stalin, evaded the need for the Party to interrogate its own failings during the Stalin's (Jones, 2003: 133). In addition, the main outcome of the ''secret speech'' was to provoke confusion among the listeners. [...]
[...] Accordingly, plenty of suggestions to perpetuate Stalin's memory were sent by the population. most conservative proposed things like the mass planting of trees, the creation of new coins bearing Stalin's silhouette, the renaming of Red Square, and the permanent designation of a five-minute silence on the anniversary of his death. But a more nauseating set of correspondence related to the idea of pantheon, something that would really put dead Soviet Leaders on the map, a building grander than Shchusev's famous granit cube? (Merridale, 2000: 334). [...]
[...] Although Stalin was not rehabilitated, heinous crimes against humanity were conveniently dismissed as 'errors', 'deviations from Leninist norms', 'mistakes', and 'consequences of the personality cult? (Wood, 1990: 64). Especially from 1968, one can describe the authoritative return implemented by Breznhev as a 'neo-Stalinism triumphant'. As Pearson stresses, ?within the Soviet Union, the neoStalinist clampdown was generally firm though sometimes belated? (Pearson, 1986: 86). For instance, the replacement of Petro Shelest, the Ukrainian Communist Party's General Secretary, by the diehard Stalinist Vladimir Shcherbitsky in 1972 marked the undermining of the De-Stalinisation 5/7 policy. [...]
[...] Indeed, the 'new' leadership wanted to strengthen their legitimacy. Referring to the past, they argued that they came within the Great Russia's historical continuity. Paralleling this lack of legitimacy among these élites, people suffered a problem to define their identity since the fall of the Soviet Union. These two elements brought about the Stalin's aggregation within the history of ?Great Russia? of Catherine II and Peter Grand''. Arseni Roginski emphasizes that war memory have sweepingly changed since the Krushev era. [...]
À propos de l'auteur
Rémi H.EtudiantHistoire contemporaine : XIXe, XXe et XXIeStalin's legacy.